Self-organization and the persistence of noise in financial markets by Goldbaum, D
Self-Organization and the Persistence of Noise in Financial Markets 
 
 
 
David Goldbaum* 
Rutgers University Newark 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 A dynamic model of financial markets with learning is demonstrated to produce a self-
organized system that displays critical behavior.  The price contains private information that 
traders learn to extract and employ to forecast future value.  Since the price reflects the beliefs of 
the traders, the learning process is self-referencing.  As the market learns to correctly extract 
information from the price, the market deemphasizes private information.  Despite the 
convergence of the model towards the parameters producing efficiency, pricing deviations 
remain constant due to the increased sensitivity of the price to small errors in information 
extraction produced by the model’s own convergence. 
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1. Introduction 
 When Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) find that no equilibrium exists able to produce efficient 
markets under rational expectations, they create one by introducing a second source of noise that 
hampers information extraction from the price.  The equilibrium is created at the expense of 
market efficiency.  Finding the conditions sufficient to create equilibrium is, of course, the 
traditional thrust of economic research.  This paper explores a dynamic model of information 
extraction for which no equilibrium exists.  Analytical analysis and simulation characterize the 
asymptotic behavior of a market in which an informationally efficient price is an unachievable 
attractor to the system.  Despite the attraction and continuous improvement in information 
extraction, the market price does not converge towards the efficient market price. 
 A fully revealing efficient price is impossible in a rational expectations equilibrium.  
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) (hereafter GS) reach this conclusion based on a market in which 
fundamental information is costly to obtain.  They find that traders who are informed with 
private information have an impact on the price.  Uninformed traders use the price to costlessly 
extract the private information.  The GS paradox is that a “long run” equilibrium does not exist.  
No trader wants to bear the cost of informing the market without reward.  Subsequent papers 
reach the same conclusion after relaxing the assumption of full rationality, for example by 
replacing rationality with dynamic learning on the part of the uninformed traders.1  This paper 
further generalizes the GS model by examining dynamic populations in concert with a dynamic 
learning process. 
 Among those papers extending GS is Bray (1982) which introduced learning through 
repeated realizations of the GS single period model.  Bray provides support for the GS 
                                                
1 Muendler (2003) demonstrates that some traders will pay to inform the market when the portfolio problem is part 
of a two period consumption problem. 
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assumption of full rationality by finding that learning converges to the rational expectations 
equilibrium (REE) for any fixed population proportion of uninformed to informed traders.  
Hussman (1992) and Timmermann (1996) also examine learning in a financial market setting.  
Like Bray, they have a static population of traders, but with a multi-period asset paying a 
dividend that follows an AR(1) process. 
 Routledge (1999) examines a dynamic population in a noisy GS model.  With two types of 
traders, a dynamic population process is introduced by allowing traders to switch strategies based 
on imitating the strategy of the more successful traders they encounter.  Thus, the single act of 
imitation embodies the two dynamic processes of learning and population evolution.  Modeled 
with a random supply of the risky asset, the exogenous noise ensures the existence of a stable 
REE.  The process generally converges to this REE. 
 Bak, Tang, and Weisenfeld (1988) introduce the notion of self-organized criticality (SOC) 
by describing what has become the canonical example of a system that attains SOC, the sand 
pile.  The slope of the sand pile increases as grains of sand are added.  At the critical slope an 
additional grain of sand causes an avalanche which locally reduces the slope and temporarily 
returns the system to stability.  The size of the avalanche is determined by local conditions.  The 
distribution of the avalanche size follows a power law.  The self-organization refers to the natural 
convergence of the system to the attracting critical slope.  The criticality refers to the chaotic 
behavior of the avalanches near the critical slope.  A number of papers have applied the notion of 
SOC to economic settings, including Bak et al (1992), Bak, Paczuski, and Shubik (1997), Berg et 
al (2001), and Challet and Marsili (2002).  The latter three describe financial markets as SOC. 
 Goldbaum (2005) separates the learning process from the population process in an 
examination of a market in which dividends follow a random walk.  The model produces self-
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organized criticality with the market attracted to a critical division in the population separating a 
stable region of the state space from an unstable region.  The system naturally oscillates between 
the two states producing critical behavior.  The market never approaches total adoption of market 
based analysis as the critical population requires a non-zero mass of informed traders.  The 
market presented in this paper also contains a phase transition, but between the two more 
traditional stable states of an informed market or an uninformed market.  It is the convergence 
towards the complete abandonment of the fundamental information, without any actual switching 
between states, that produces the interesting market behavior.  The convergence properties under 
learning as discussed by Marcet and Sargent (1989a, 1989b) are keenly relevant. 
 The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 introduces the model of the market. The 
population is divided into those who are informed with private fundamental information and 
those who attempt to extract information from the price.  The nature of the private information is 
developed along with the trading strategy of those who obtain it.  The method by which traders 
learn to extract information from the price is also described in this section.  Section 3 presents 
analysis of the model under learning and introduces the dynamic population process.  Simulation 
results characterize the model’s asymptotic behavior, displaying the critical behavior produced 
by the model’s self-organizing aspect.  The model developed in Section 4 removes the artificial 
population division, allowing all traders to both receive private information and extract 
information from the price.  This model is also examined through simulation.  Conclusions are 
drawn in Section 5 of the paper. 
2. Model 
 The market setting is similar to Goldbaum (2005) with the modification that the dividend 
follows an AR(1) process rather than a random walk.  This small change produces substantially 
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different market behavior.  The following provides a basic description of the environment and 
solutions based on the stationary dividend process. 
2.1 The market 
 A large but finite number of agents, indexed by i = 1, ..., N, trade a risky asset and a risk-
free bond.  The risk-free bond, with a price of one, pays R.  The risky asset is purchased at the 
market determined price, pt, in period t.  In t+1, it pays a stochastic dividend dt+1, and sells for the 
ex dividend market determined price pt+1.  The market participants are aware that the stochastic 
dividend follows a commonly known AR(1) process centered around d0: 
  tt dd η+= 0 , 
  with ttt ε+φη=η −1 , ),0(~
2
εσε IIDNt . (1) 
 Let ttt dpz +=  and itθ  = 1/
2
itγσ  with 
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itσ  = )(var 1+tit z  indicating the conditional variance.  
The parameter γ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.  In each period, each myopic trader 
maximizes a negative exponential utility function on one period ahead wealth conditional on his 
individual information set (to be developed below).  This produces the demand for the risky 
asset, 
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 Assume K strategies for estimating payoffs, 1+tz .  In a Walrasian equilibrium, the market 
price equates supply and demand for the asset.  Supply is fixed to avoid the exogenous 
introduction of noise.  For convenience, set fixed net supply of the risky asset to zero.  Let Nk be 
the total number of traders employing information kI .  Let ktq  be the per capita demand for the 
risky security among group k traders, ∑
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proportion of the trader population employing strategy k, 1=∑ kn .  The price pt clears the 
market by solving 
  ∑
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)(0 . (3) 
2.2 Information 
2.2.1 The fundamental trader 
 The estimate of the future payoff is in the nature of Hellwig (1980).  Trader i’s private 
research conducted at time t produces a noisy signal of the intrinsic value at time t+1.  This 
information gathering process is captured by the time t private signal, its , centered around dt+1, 
but subject to an idiosyncratic error term, 
  ,101 ittittit ededs +η+=+= ++  (4) 
  with ),0(~ 2eit IIDNe σ . 
 A linear projection of ηt+1 onto the information set produces the fundamental investor's 
mean squared error minimizing forecast 
  ),|( 1 ittti sE ηη +  = itt sβ+φηβ− )1(  (5) 
where the weight β is known based on the traders' knowledge of the dividend and information 
processes, 
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 The "fundamental" price prevails in a market populated exclusively by fundamental 
investors.  Derive the fundamental price by using the estimate (5) in (2), 
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1 .  Price is a function of the current private and public information.  
Advancing (6) one period, substituting it into the demand (2) and using the market clearing 
condition (3), the price coefficients solve to )1/(00 −= Rdb , )/()1(1 φ−φβ−= Rb
F  and 
)/(2 φ−β= Rb
F .  The fact that prices, Ftp  here and the general market clearing price pt elsewhere 
in the paper, are functions of tη  and 1+ηt  will be implicit, captured by the subscript t.  Future 
discussions of the fixed point price refer to the pricing equation at which the coefficients take on 
their fixed point values.  There is not a time independent value for the price at the fixed point. 
 For large N, the impact of the idiosyncratic signal noise on the price is negligible.  Assume 
a sufficiently large N such that the tν  term can be dropped.
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00 .  As the private signal becomes increasingly 
noisy, the price converges to reflect just the public information contained in dt, i.e. the price is 
Semistrong-form efficient according to the Fama (1970) definitions of efficiency.  For 2eσ  = 0, 
F
tp  = 1
0 1
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EM
t RR
dp .  When traders receive a perfect noise-free signal on the next 
period’s dividend, the price fully reflects the dt+1 based value producing a Strong-form efficient 
price.  Between the two extremes of signal accuracy, Ftp  is not efficient, reflecting a weighted 
combination of the public dt and the private dt+1 information. 
 Fundamental traders rely on (6) in forming demand.  Plug (6) back into (2) to solve for the 
average demand of the group of fundamental traders, 
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2 Formally, νt is o(1). 
8 
2.2.2 Regression traders 
 The regression traders model the relationship between the payoff, 111 +++ += ttt dpz , and 
current market observables.  The traders appropriately estimate 
  tttt cpccz ζ+η++= −− 12110 . (8) 
 The traders employ least-squares learning to update the parameters of their model.  The 
learning process is self-referential with an endogenous state variable, pt-1, included as a 
regressor.  The value of c0 is exogenous to beliefs and can be derived analytically by the traders 
given their knowledge of the dividend process.  Thus traders impose the correct value of c0.  Let 
xt' = [1 pt ηt].  The regression traders update the coefficients, ct = [c0 c1t c2t], using the standard 
recursive updating algorithm for least-squares learning of Marcet and Sargent (1989a, 1989b): 
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given (c0, Q0).  The regression traders all rely on the same public information, and thus all 
employ the same forecast, )|( 1 tt xzE + .  Per capita demand among regression traders is thus 
  Rtq  = )( ttt
R
t Rpx −θ c . (10) 
2.3 Price Formation 
 With K = 2, let nt = Ftn , and thus (1-nt) = 
R
tn .  From (3), 
  0 = Rtt
F
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Use (7), (10), and (11) to solve for the market clearing price.  A consistent price function takes 
the form 
  pt = 1210 ),(),(),( +η+η+= ttttttttt nbnbbnp ccc  (12) 
with 
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3. Analysis and simulation 
3.1 Learning under fixed n 
 Consider just the learning process by fixing nt = n.  A fixed point to the learning process 
given n is established.  Based on this solution, the implicit evolution in the population can be 
developed and examined before resorting to simulations. 
3.1.1 A fixed point solution 
 Three equations describe the dynamic processes under a fixed n.  Equation (1) is the 
exogenous dividend process.  Equation (12) is the endogenous price equation.  The coefficients 
of (12) depend on the beliefs of the regression traders as captured by (8) that evolve according to 
(9) and upon the fixed proportion of the market relying on fundamental analysis. 
 The fixed point for the learning process produces a fixed point pricing function )(* npt  
based on the solution, for 0 < n ≤ 1: 
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For n = 0 the regression captured by (8) is undefined since pt-1 is a linear function of 1−ηt .  Note 
that n → 0 produces )(*1 nc  → R, )(
*
2 nc  → 0 and for n = 0, )0(
*
1c  = R and )0(
*
2c  = 0 is a 
consistent solution producing )0(*1b  = φ /(R-φ ) and )0(
*
2b  = 0. 
 Regardless of n, )()( *2
*
1 nbnb φ+  = φ /(R-φ ).  This result ensures that the fundamental 
trader’s demand is unaffected by n.  Equation (7), derived based on n = 1, is correct for the 
mixed population setting as well, substantiating the use of (7) in deriving the market equilibrium 
solution. 
 The solution described by (14) through (16) is implicitly defined since )(*2 nb  in (14) and 
the conditional variance terms in (16) remain interdependent.3  The fixed point solutions based 
on the typical exogenous parameter values used in the simulations are plotted in Figure 1 as 
functions of n. 
  [Figure 1 about here] 
 At the fixed point the regression traders correctly deduce the relationship between price and 
payoff.  This is equivalent to knowing the value of dt+1.  Essentially, at the fixed point the 
regression traders know the values of the price coefficients in (12) and thus can use the price to 
derive the value of 1+ηt  and thus dt+1.  That the price reveals dt+1 is not equivalent to having the 
price fully reflect dt+1, the latter requiring pt = EMtp .  In general 
  1221 ))/(())/(( +εφ−φ−φ+ηφ−φ−φ+=− ttttt
EM
tt RbRbbpp . (17) 
Since nRnbnb ∀φ−φ=φ+ )/()()( *2
*
1 , the first term of (17) is equal to zero for all )(
* npt .  The 
first term thus takes a zero value when the regression model is correct, regardless of n.  The 
                                                
3 Solving for )(*2 nb  involves solving a cubic polynomial.  The unique real solution is available, but lengthy. 
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second term only converges to zero when the regression model is correct and n → 0.  With 
0* )0( tt pp =  there is no value of n at which 
EM
tt pnp =)(
* .4 
3.1.2 Performance 
 Let the measure of profits earned by each information source be the excess return realized 
for the risky asset multiplied by the group average demand: 
  )( 11 ttt
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k
t Rpdpq −+= ++π , k = F, R. (18) 
Based on the fixed point solution, the modeler with knowledge of n can compute 
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for 0 < n ≤ 1 and (19) 
  =π )( FE β/(1-β), E(πR) = 0 at n = 0. (20) 
 Thus, for all values of n > 0, the fixed point expected profits are positive for the regression 
traders and weakly negative for fundamental traders.  The regression traders outperform the 
fundamental traders because with a correct model of the relationship between price and payoff, 
the price is a better source of information, revealing dt+1, than is the noisy signal. 
 A discrete jump in profits occurs at n = 0, reflecting the benefits to even noisy information 
on ηt+1, when the price reflects only the public time t information.  There is no value of n at 
which )()( RF EE π=π . 
3.2 Evolution in the population 
 Allow for dynamics in the population proportion.  The Replicator Dynamic model of 
population evolution produces an dynamic population in which the dominant strategy attracts 
                                                
4 Efficient market is in the nature of Radner (1979).  The price reflects the aggregation of the fundamental traders 
knowledge since no individual trader knows dt+1 with certainty. 
12 
converts from the inferior strategy.  The two choice version of the more general K choice 
replicator dynamic model found in Branch and McGough (2003) results in the transition 
equation 
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where Fetπ  and 
Re
tπ  indicate the traders’ performance measures of fundamental and market-based 
approaches, respectively.  These are updated according to the process 
  tket
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t /)( 111 −−− π−π+π=π , (22) 
00 =π
ke , k = F, R. 5 
 A number of different functional forms for r exist in the literature.  The simulations that 
follow are based upon 
  ))2/tanh()( xxr δ= , (23) 
a choice that ensures 0 < nt < 1 for bounded Ret
Fe
t π−π .  Thus, by construction, the discontinuity 
of n = 0 will never be realized in the simulation.  The parameter δ determines how responsive the 
population is to differences in expected profits. 
 From (19), given ct = c*(nt) there is no value of nt that produced equal profits, thus there is 
no joint fixed point to both the learning and population processes.  Without the assumption ct = 
c*(nt), the learning and the population processes must evolve together.  In Figure 2, the 3-
dimentional phase space in nt, c1t, and c2t has been collapsed to two dimensions by setting c2t to 
be consistent with the c1t parameter, a feat accomplished by replacing )(*1 nc  in the )(
*
2 nc  
solution of (15) with tc1 .  In the phase space plotted in Figure 2, the learning process updates the 
                                                
5 For continuity in estimation, assume all traders maintain and update the regression trader’s model which they 
ignore as fundamental trades. 
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regression coefficients and thus moves the model vertically in the phase space.  The population 
process creates an evolution in nt and thus moves the model horizontally.  The curve labeled “ *1c
” plots the nt dependent fixed point values )(*1 tnc  that represent the correct c1 for the given nt 
(the same curve labeled “ *1c ” in the second row of Figure 1). 
 The curves )(1 nc
−  and )(1 nc
+  are the two outer boundaries between which the regression 
traders’ parameters are sufficiently accurate to produce positive expected regression trader 
profits.  Above )(*1 nc  the regression traders over-react to price innovations.  Along )(1 nc
+ , 
expected profits are zero because the over-reaction forces ),( np tt
+c  = EMtp  so that 
)( 11 ttt RpdpE −+ ++  in (18) is equal to zero.  Along )(1 nc
− , the regression traders’ under-reaction 
to price innovations produces ),( np tt
−c  = Ftp  and thus 0==
R
t
F
t qq  in (18).  Above )(1 nc
+  and 
below )(1 nc
−  the regression traders’ beliefs are sufficiently in error to produce expected profits 
for the fundamental traders. 
 At tc1  = 1c , the regression traders’ strong positive response to a price increase creates an 
upward sloping demand curve.  The curve thus represents an n dependent upper bound on the 
value of tc1 .  By (2) demand is attenuated by large estimates in the conditional variance.  The 
regression traders estimate the conditional variance based on the mean squared regression error.  
Including the current period’s price in the regression traders’ current estimate of the conditional 
variance allows the model parameters to exist above 1c  but still produce finite market prices. 
 Analysis of the phase space suggests a convergence path between the curves *1c  and 
+
1c  
that, under the RD, leads to the point nt = 0 and c1t = R. 
  [Figure 2 about here] 
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3.3 Simulations 
 Simulations are necessary to determine convergence properties when allowing for the 
interaction between the learning and population processes.  Figures 3 through 6 display the 
typical evolution of endogenous parameters produced by δ = 0.01 and δ = 1.  Each frame plots 
the time progression of one of the endogenous parameters of the model.  Across the top row are 
plotted the price parameters tb1  + tb2φ  and tb2φ , each determining the coefficients of the two 
terms in (17).  The time series are plotted in grey.  A solid black line at )/( φ−φ R  indicates the 
attracting value that also produces an efficient price.  The second row contains the regression 
coefficients from the regression traders’ extraction, tc1  and tc2 , plotted in grey.  The black curve 
plots the respective element of )(* tt nc , the correct coefficient values for the regression traders 
given the nt value.  The lines at R and zero in their respective frames represent the attracting 
values of the learning process as nt → 0.  The bottom row presents the population parameter nt 
and the difference pt – EMtp . 
 The data plotted in Figures 3 are from the first 50,000 periods of a simulation based on δ = 
0.01 after dropping the first 100 observations.  The parameter δ from (23) determines the rate of 
adjustment in the population towards the superior performing choice.  The smooth progression of 
nt is the result of a population reluctant to switch approaches.  The slow moving nt produces a 
slow moving target to the learning process, making it easy for the regression parameters to keep 
pace with the changing market environment. 
  [Figure 3 about here] 
 It seems reasonable to consider the extent to which the results may be driven by the 
parameters of the model.  Given that the price remains bounded, the initial values and the 
parameters do not substantially change the results of the model.  The regression parameters and 
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the population simultaneously converge, )(* tt ncc →  and nt → 0.  The state may change 
substantially from period to period early in the simulation when a single observation can 
substantially change ct or )( Ret
Fe
t π−πδ , the latter producing a large jump in nt.  As t increases, 
the single period innovations in ct, Fetπ , and 
Re
tπ  become small.  Figure 4 demonstrates that a 
large δ introduce cycles into the convergence without undermining the fact of the convergence. 
  [Figure 4 about here] 
 The declining cycles seen in Figure 4 (and more pronounced in Figure 6) results from the 
evolution in nt outpacing the evolution in the regression coefficients.  The higher δ = 1 setting 
produces greater responsiveness in the trader population to differences in performance.  Profits 
earned by the accuracy of the regression equation cause nt to drop, but at a rate faster than the 
regression coefficients can keep pace.  When nt becomes too low for the contemporaneous 
regression parameters, the pricing error allows the fundamental traders to profit, temporarily 
reversing the progress in nt. 
 For both δ = 0.01 and δ = 1 the system shows convergence towards nt = 0.  Figures 5 and 6 
display the parameter values from the same simulation during the t = 1.5x106 to t = 2.0x106 
interval.  The most striking characteristic is that despite the continued convergence of the 
population and learning processes toward values that analytically produce greater efficient 
markets, the price and the price coefficients do not seem to reflect this advancement. 
  [Figure 5 about here] 
  [Figure 6 about here] 
 The convergence in both the learning and population parameters under the two values of δ 
demonstrates that the self-organization of the market is the interplay between learning, profits, 
and the population.  Early in the simulation the regression coefficients quickly converged to 
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reflect the concurrent value of nt.  In (17), errors in beliefs by the regression traders cause the 
first term to deviate from zero, but for large nt, the second term dominates, becoming the 
determining factor for the failure of market efficiency.  The accuracy of regression produces 
)(* ttt npp ≈ , but the regression traders’ market impact remains low so that )(
*
tt np  remains 
distant from EMtp . 
 The accuracy of the regression trader beliefs produce superior performance, driving nt 
towards zero and )(* tt np  → 
EM
tp .  For small values of nt, )/()(
*
2 φ−φ−φ Rnb t  is approximately 
zero and yet the simulation produces a price consistently different from EMtp .  The errors in 
*
11 bb t ≠  and 
*
22 bb t ≠  caused by )(
*
tt ncc ≠  mean neither term of (17) is zero.  Once nt is 
sufficiently small, deviation in b2t from )(*2 tnb  becomes a greater source of error in 
)/(2 φ−φ−φ Rb t  than the difference between )(
*
2 tnb  and )(
*
2 nb  as n → 0.  Further convergence 
in )(* tt ncc →  and nt towards zero does not noticeably improve the market efficiency. 
 Intuition might lead one to believe that continued learning by the regression traders would 
increase the efficiency of the price.  Two explanations for why this is not the case deserve 
discussion.  The convergence of )(* tt ncc →  produces progression in nt towards zero.  This 
changes the target for tc  in the learning process, impeding further model improvement.  
Improvement occurs nonetheless and thus this endogenously produced error in learning is not the 
underlying cause of the failure to observe pt → EMtp .  The decreasing nt also produces instability 
by increasing the need for accuracy on the part of the regression traders.  From (14), assuming 
)(* nt cc = , nt → 0 produces 0)(
*
1 →nb  and )/(
*
2 φ−φ→φ Rb .  Thus, as nt → 0, 
EM
ttt pnp →)(
* .  
Without the assumption of )(* tt ncc = , an examination of (13) reveals that both the numerator 
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and denominator of both ),(1 ttnb c  and ),(2 ttnb c  converge to zero as )(
*
tt ncc →  and nt → 0; 
),(1 ttnb c  → 0/0 and ),(2 ttnb c  → 0/0.  The closer the true market is to efficiency, the greater 
the impact of a small error in the regression traders’ model on the price.  The market is self-
organized to remain inefficient even as )(* tt ncc →  and nt → 0. 
 Consider again the phase space in Figure 2.  Recall that along )(1 nc
+ , pt = EMtp . The 
convergence of )(1 nc
+ - *1c  → 0 is a reflection of (17), that the price produced by the correct 
beliefs of the regression traders produces the convergence pt → EMtp .  Recall as well that along 
)(1 nc
− , pt = 0tp .  The narrowing of the distance between )(1 nc
−  and )(1 nc
+  as nt → 0 indicates a 
narrowing in the pricing mechanism’s tolerance for error in the regression trader’s beliefs.  As 
the market becomes increasingly reliant on the regression traders to set the price, small errors in 
the regression traders’ model produced substantial pricing error. 
 The self-organization of the system contributes to the stability of the pricing error 
distribution.  A tendency for substantial error in the regression model results in a large nt, putting 
the model in a region in which the regression traders have little ability to produce wildly 
incorrect prices.  Only once the regression traders are fairly accurate with their model can nt 
converge towards zero, a region in which the market is heavily dependent on their beliefs.  
Profits regulate nt.  The system only achieves nt → 0 when the regression trader model is 
sufficiently correct and stable such that doing so does not cause an increase in the pricing error.  
An increasingly correct regression trader model produces a decline in the amount of self 
produced error in the price so that |)(| * ttt npp −  and ||
EM
tt pp −  should both fall.  It is the 
resulting accuracy induced decline in nt that increases the requirement for model accuracy, 
reversing the gains in |)(| * ttt npp − .  The net result is zero improvement in the market 
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efficiency.  The stability of the distribution of the pricing error despite the improving regression 
trader model is consistent with the GS finding that information content of the price is unaffected 
by the variance of their model’s exogenous noise. 
4. Complete Information 
4.1 Learning 
 In this section traders are allowed to employ both the public price and the private signal in 
determining a forecast of the value of the risky security.  Traders are modeled as learning agents 
individually estimating the relationship6 
  ititittittitt sccpccz ς++η++= −− 312110 . (24) 
Let cit = [c0 c1it c2it c3it] be the estimated individual regression coefficients, where xt’ = [
)(  1 ,1 tittt ep +ηη + ].  Individual demand is 
  2/)( itttitit Rpxq γσ−= c . (25) 
The equilibrium price solution that sets ∑
i
itq  = 0 takes the same linear structure as in (12), 
  pt = 1210 )()( +η+η+ tttt bbb cc , (26) 
but with 
  ∑θΨ= −
i
itittt cb 2
1
1 )(c , ∑θΨ= −
i
itittt cb 3
1
2 )(c , (27) 
  ∑ −θ=Ψ
i
ititt cR )( 1 . 
 All traders share the same time consistent beliefs at the fixed point.  The fixed point for the 
learning process produces the regression coefficients 
  Rc =*1 , 0
*
2 =c , 0
*
3 =c . 
                                                
6 The model closely resembles that of Hellwig (1982) in its structure, except that the traders employ the 
contemporaneous price rather than the lagged price. 
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The price and the price coefficients are indeterminate at the fixed point, 
  )/( *1
*
2
*
1 cRcb −= , )/(
*
1
*
3
*
2 cRcb −= . 
 As the system approaches the fixed point, traders are able to rely heavily on the price for 
information on the value of dt+1.  They place positive, but negligible, weight on their noisy 
private signal since the price is an almost perfect indicator of dt+1. 
 At the fixed point, both price and private information are removed from the agents’ demand 
function in (25) and demand for the risky asset becomes zero.  The No Trade solution is attained.  
The price is removed because the traders believe the market has converged to the point at which 
pt fully reveals dt+1, removing the ability of the price to reveal profitable trades.  At the same 
time, the noisy private information is completely dominated by pt, and thus receives zero weight.  
In a GS type paradox, the reality of the fixed point is just the opposite of the traders’ belief.  The 
price contains no information, both because no one trades based on the dt+1 information and 
because any price clears the market. 
4.2 Simulations 
 Simulations produce market behavior much like that produced by the Replicator Dynamics.  
The typical progression can be seen in Figures 7 and 8.  The positive value of the coefficient c3t 
indicates that the traders choose to rely on the fundamental signal.  The convergence of c3t 
towards zero suggests that the traders are able to reduce their reliance on the private signal as the 
price becomes an increasingly reliant indicator of dt+1.  The greater reliance on the price is 
reflected in the increasing value of c1t towards its fixed point value of R.  As previously obtained, 
the convergence of the regression coefficients towards the efficient market values does not 
produce convergence in pt towards EMtp . 
  [Figure 7 about here] 
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  [Figure 8 about here] 
5. Conclusion 
 The analysis explores a dynamic financial market model that lacks a fixed point.  The 
unattainable point of attraction is market efficiency in which the price fully reflects the aggregate 
of private information.  Though the market is constructed to preclude the existence of an 
equilibrium with an efficient price, this absence is not the driving force behind the failure to 
achieve market efficiency.  The failure to produce an efficient price is the result of the interaction 
between the two dynamic processes, accuracy of the model extracting information from the price 
and the extent to which the market relies on this model to set the price. 
 Traders maintain and update a model of the relationship between observed price and future 
payoff.  By construction, if the traders have an accurate model of the pricing equation, then the 
price is a better source of information than the noisy signal received through individual 
fundamental based research.  The market serves as a filter on individual traders’ errors, leaving 
the price as an error-free indicator of the underlying information.  Improvements in this pricing 
model should reasonably produce both increased accuracy of the market price at reflecting value 
and convergence towards an efficient market.  This does not turn out to be the case.  
Improvement in the ability to extract information from the price elicits greater reliance on 
market-based information by the traders.  As the population of traders decreases its dependence 
on the fundamental information the tolerance for error in the perceived model also declines.  As 
the traders become increasingly accurate in their extraction of information from the price the 
market requires an increasingly accurate model. 
 The rate at which the traders’ pricing model improves and the rate of increasing reliance on 
the market-based information co-evolve.  Each modulates the other to maintain balance so that 
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the magnitude of the market’s error in pricing remains stable as the other parameters in the 
model continue to converge. 
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Figure 1 Fixed point values of )(*1 nb , )(
*
2 nb , )(
*
1 nc , )(
*
2 nc , )(
* nFσ , )(
* nRσ  plotted against n. 
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Figure 2: Phase-space in nt and 1tc .  The curve labeled 
*
1c  is the correct n dependent regression coefficient.  The curve labeled 1c  is an 
upper bound on tc1  for the market price to remain finite.  For tc1  between 
+
1c  and 
−
1c  the regression model is sufficiently accurate to 
generate profits for the regression traders.  Outside of this region, the fundamental traders are expected to profit. 
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Figure 3: Evolution of endogenous parameters. RD dynamics, δ = 0.01, beginning of sample (t = 100 – 50,100).  Row one left: 
tt bb 21 φ+  with the solid black line at )/( φ−φ R .  tt bb 21 φ+  = )/( φ−φ R  implies the regression traders have the correct model.  Row 
one right: tb2φ  with the solid black line at )/( φ−φ R .  )/(2 φ−φ=φ Rb t  implies an efficient market.  Row two left: tc1  (lighter shade 
or green) and )(*1 tnc  (darker shade or red).  Row two right:  tc2  (lighter shade or green) and )(
*
2 tnc  (darker shade or red).  
Rnc t →)(
*
1  and 0)(
*
2 →tnc  as nt → 0.  Row three left: nt.  Row three right: 
EM
tt pp −  with a solid black line a zero. 
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Figure 4: Evolution of endogenous parameters.  RD dynamics, δ = 1, beginning of sample (t = 100 – 50,100).  Row one left: tt bb 21 φ+  
with the solid black line at )/( φ−φ R .  tt bb 21 φ+  = )/( φ−φ R  implies the regression traders have the correct model.  Row one right: 
tb2φ  with the solid black line at )/( φ−φ R .  )/(2 φ−φ=φ Rb t  implies an efficient market.  Row two left: tc1  (lighter shade or green) 
and )(*1 tnc  (darker shade or red).  Row two right:  tc2  (lighter shade or green) and )(
*
2 tnc  (darker shade or red).  Rnc t →)(
*
1  and 
0)(*2 →tnc  as nt → 0.  Row three left: nt.  Row three right: 
EM
tt pp −  with a solid black line a zero. 
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Figure 5: Evolution of endogenous parameters.  RD dynamics, δ = 0.01, end of sample (t = 1.5 – 2.0x106).  Row one left: tt bb 21 φ+  
with the solid black line at )/( φ−φ R .  tt bb 21 φ+  = )/( φ−φ R  implies the regression traders have the correct model.  Row one right: 
tb2φ  with the solid black line at )/( φ−φ R .  )/(2 φ−φ=φ Rb t  implies an efficient market.  Row two left: tc1  (lighter shade or green) 
and )(*1 tnc  (darker shade or red).  Row two right:  tc2  (lighter shade or green) and )(
*
2 tnc  (darker shade or red).  Rnc t →)(
*
1  and 
0)(*2 →tnc  as nt → 0.  Row three left: nt.  Row three right: 
EM
tt pp −  with a solid black line a zero. 
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Figure 6: Evolution of endogenous parameters.  RD dynamics, δ = 1, end of sample (t = 1.5 – 2.0x106).  Row one left: tt bb 21 φ+  with 
the solid black line at )/( φ−φ R .  tt bb 21 φ+  = )/( φ−φ R  implies the regression traders have the correct model.  Row one right: tb2φ  
with the solid black line at )/( φ−φ R .  )/(2 φ−φ=φ Rb t  implies an efficient market.  Row two left: tc1  (lighter shade or green) and 
)(*1 tnc  (darker shade or red).  Row two right:  tc2  (lighter shade or green) and )(
*
2 tnc  (darker shade or red).  Rnc t →)(
*
1  and 
0)(*2 →tnc  as nt → 0.  Row three left: nt.  Row three right: 
EM
tt pp −  with a solid black line a zero. 
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Figure 7: Evolution of endogenous parameters.  Complete Information, beginning of sample (t = 100 – 50,100).  Row one left: 
tt bb 21 φ+  with the solid black line at )/( φ−φ R .  tt bb 21 φ+  = )/( φ−φ R  implies the regression traders have the correct model.  Row 
one right: tb2φ  with the solid black line at )/( φ−φ R .  )/(2 φ−φ=φ Rb t  implies an efficient market.  Row two left: tc1  with a solid 
black line at R.  Row two right: tc2  with a solid black line at zero.  Row three left: tc3 .  Row three right: 
EM
tt pp −  with a solid black 
line a zero. 
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Figure 8: Evolution of endogenous parameters.  Complete Information, end of sample (t = 1.5 – 2.0x106).  Row one left: tt bb 21 φ+  
with the solid black line at )/( φ−φ R .  tt bb 21 φ+  = )/( φ−φ R  implies the regression traders have the correct model.  Row one right: 
tb2φ  with the solid black line at )/( φ−φ R .  )/(2 φ−φ=φ Rb t  implies an efficient market.  Row two left: tc1  with a solid black line at 
R.  Row two right: tc2  with a solid black line at zero.  Row three left: tc3 .  Row three right: 
EM
tt pp −  with a solid black line a zero. 
 
